We measure systemic risk in the network of financial market infrastructures (FMIs) as the probability that two or more FMIs have a large credit risk exposure to the same FMI participant. We construct indicators of credit risk exposures in three main Canadian FMIs during the period 2007-11 and use extreme value methods to estimate this probability. We find large differences in the contribution to systemic risk across participants. We also find that when participants are in financial distress, they tend to create large credit exposures in two or more FMIs. Our results suggest that an appropriate oversight of FMIs may benefit from an in-depth system-wide analysis, which may have useful implications for the macroprudential regulation of the financial system.
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Introduction
Financial market infrastructures (FMIs) are at the heart of every country's …nancial system. They facilitate the clearing, settling or recording of payments, securities, derivatives or other …nancial transactions among participating entities. They allow consumers and …rms to safely and e¢ ciently purchase goods and services, make …nancial investments and transfer funds. Because of their systemic importance, FMIs are regulated and overseen by central banks and other authorities.
However, relatively little is known about the risks that participants can create in the network of FMIs. Our article is one of the …rst attempts to measure these risks.
We measure systemic risk in the network of FMIs, de…ning it as the probability that two or more
FMIs have a large credit risk exposure to the same participant. We …rst construct indicators of credit risk exposures from the point of view of the following three main Canadian FMIs: the Large
Value Transfer System (LVTS), the Canadian Derivatives Clearing Service (CDCS) and CDSX (owned and operated by Clearing and Depository Services Inc.). These FMIs have a leading role in the clearing and settlement of cash payments, derivatives and other securities. 1 We de…ne credit risk exposure as the payment obligation that a participant has with an FMI at the end of the day.
We consider both gross payment obligations and net payment obligations (net of any collateral pledged by the participant). We calculate these indicators using a database with detailed daily data on prices, positions, margins and other types of collateral for every FMI's participant for the period 2007-11.
Based on these credit risk indicators, we use extreme value methods to estimate the probability of the tail event that two or more FMIs have a large credit risk exposure to the same participant.
We also estimate the conditional probability that one or more FMI has a large credit risk exposure to a participant, conditional on another FMI having a large exposure to the same participant.
These conditional probabilities provide useful information about the systemic risk contribution of one or more FMIs to another FMI by a participant. Authors such as Lehar (2005) , Segoviano et al. (2009) , Gravelle and Li (2013) , and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2015) , among others, have proposed measures of the systemic importance of a …nancial institution or group of …nancial insti- 1 The three FMIs have been designated as "systemically important" by the Payment Clearing and Settlement Act because they have the potential to pose systemic risk to Canada's …nancial system. tutions in the …nancial system. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the …rst to propose a measure of systemic risk in the network of FMIs that is based on the existence of participant-based interdependencies between FMIs.
The detailed database we compiled allows us to …nd a rich set of results with interesting implications. First, when considering a set of seven large participants of all three FMIs, we …nd large di¤erences in systemic risk measures across participants, and we …nd that three participants have, on average, a larger contribution to systemic risk than the other participants. We then re-estimate these probabilities by conditioning on the participant being close to …nancial distress (crash, failure or collapse). We use stock returns as a measure of …nancial distress. On average, we …nd that participants that are more likely to be in …nancial distress contribute more to systemic risk in the network of FMIs.
Our research contributes to the literature on systemic risk by measuring participant-based interdependencies between FMIs, which arise from the activities of one participant in two or more FMIs (BIS, 2008) . Previous analysis has mainly considered dependencies between FMIs due to services that are provided by one FMI and used by other FMIs. These dependencies can be important. For instance, collateral for the LVTS is pledged through CDSX, whereas CDSX funds are settled at the end of the day in the LVTS. CDCS relies operationally on CDSX and the LVTS for margin requirements and cash-settlement, respectively.
Our methodology has direct implications for better understanding …nancial stress across FMIs.
FMIs are typically required to have su¢ cient pre-pledged collateral/funding available to cover a default situation in every FMI and thus mitigate the potential for systemic risk across FMIs.
However, the default of a participant with a large exposure in two or more FMIs is a very stressful event for the network of FMIs, and current stress tests used in FMIs typically do not consider this scenario. 2 Under some circumstances, liquidity and market risks in such a situation could be substantial, and there would be signi…cant stress and uncertainty in the market that could a¤ect participants across systems. Non-defaulting participants may have to use their own resources to cover this obligation in every FMI. This could create additional stress in all participants and FMIs, and it could potentially create defaults of participants or possibly FMIs, making this initial default a systemic event. Regardless of the probability of this chain of events occurring in a future …nancial crisis, our paper provides a methodology for better understanding risks in the network of FMIs.
These results may be useful for regulators and policy-makers. Currently, there is a set of initiatives promoted and being implemented by central banks and other international organizations that are designed to improve the safety and soundness of FMIs as key elements in controlling systemic risk in the …nancial system. 3 Our work could have important implications for the appropriate macroprudential regulation of the …nancial system. 4 The safety and soundness of FMIs has been at the center of the policy interest in most central banks for several decades. Much of the literature focuses on the study of large-value payment systems, considering topics such as network topology (Embree and Roberts, 2009; Bech et al., 2010; Chapman et al., 2011) or e¢ ciency e¤ects (Allen et al., 2015) . The empirical work on other FMIs is more recent, mainly due to limitations on data availability. 5 Some recent studies use proprietary data from central counterparties (CCPs) to study issues such as systemic risk within a CCP (Cruz Lopez et al., 2013; Jones and Pérignon, 2013) or the e¤ects of central clearing on collateral demand and prices (Du¢ e et al., 2015; Menkveld et al., 2015) .
One of the …rst articles to study the interactions between FMIs is Renault et al. (2007) . There is also some recent work that studies the links between di¤erent types of FMIs from a network perspective (León and Pérez, 2014; León et al., 2014) . Anderson et al. (2013) and Mägerle and Nellen (2015) use credit risk exposures to study the degree of e¢ ciency of di¤erent linked CCP structures. As well, Embree and Millar (2008) study the risks associated with interactions between a payment system and a securities settlement system.
With the recent …nancial crisis, there has been a greater interest in applying extreme value 3 One clear example is the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMIs) from the CPMI-IOSCO (BIS, 2012) that serve as important risk management principles for systemically important FMIs. Among other issues, the PFMIs discuss the importance of measuring, monitoring and managing credit risk exposures, as well as risks related to links between FMIs (see also BIS, 2008) . 4 For instance, a participant could be classi…ed as individually systemic because of its large contribution to systemic risk in the network of FMIs, and therefore it could receive special attention from regulators, since a default by the participant could potentially create signi…cant stress in the network of FMIs.
5 Because payment systems are highly connected to the daily operations of central banks and the implementation of monetary policy, there is usually more data available and research conducted related to these systems. theory methods, pioneered by Fisher and Tippett (1928) to measure the systemic importance of …nancial institutions. See Poon et al. (2004) , Hartmann et al. (2005) , Acharya et al. (2010) or Gravelle and Li (2013) , to cite a few. These methods have been proven to be useful for measuring tail events in the …nancial industry. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the …rst application of extreme value methods to measure systemic risk in the network of FMIs.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the methodology used to estimate systemic risk across FMIs. Section 3 describes the industry and proposes a set of indicators to estimate credit risk across FMIs. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Estimating systemic risk across FMIs
Systemic risk across FMIs
Following work by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2008), there exist three major types of dependencies between FMIs: (i) system-based dependencies, which arise from direct links between FMIs (FMI-based interdependencies); (ii) environmental dependencies, which refer to the dependence of FMIs on common third-party services or infrastructure providers; and (iii) participant-based dependencies, which refer to the links between two or more FMIs through a common participant. In our paper, we focus on number (iii), but we concur with the importance of the other two. The type of link that we consider is particularly relevant for Canada because the …nancial industry is concentrated in a small number of large …nancial institutions. The default of a large participant could create signi…cant stress in the FMIs, and it could potentially create additional stress on the surviving participants.
We classify exposures from the point of view of their type. BIS (2012) provides de…nitions of credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk and other types of risk. In our paper, we focus on credit risk, which is de…ned as "the risk that a counterparty will be unable to meet fully its …nancial obligations when due or at any time in the future" (see Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, page 19). 6 We measure credit risk as the end-of-day payment obligation that a participant has to the FMI. We consider both gross payment obligations and net payment obligations (net of any collateral pledged by the participant with the FMI).
Credit risk exposures can be classi…ed from the point of view of the entity that is exposed.
There is a two-sided relationship between every FMI and every participant, and the risks faced by the FMI or the participant are two sides of the same coin. For instance, a participant is exposed to the default/distress of the FMI or the FMI participants, because in case of a default of one participant, the obligations with the surviving participants may not be ful…lled by the FMI. In our paper, we focus on the exposure of an FMI to the participant: The FMI/surviving participants will face distress as a result of a participant in default/distress. For instance, in Figure 1 we show a simple case where two participants are members of all three FMIs. A default of participant 1 could be a very stressful event for participant 2 if it needs to use its own resources to cover this default in every FMI.
We denote by E b j the credit risk exposure associated with participant b in FMI j. This credit risk exposure is measured as the end-of-day payment obligation in the FMI, and we assume the following sign convention:
We are interested in situations where FMI j is exposed to participant b, i.e., E b j < 0. Because some participants are much larger than others, the order of magnitude of the exposures varies across participants. Therefore, it is important to consider relative levels of exposures rather than absolute levels. For instance, if we consider a threshold of $500 million, this threshold can be too high for a small provincial participant, but too low a threshold for a large global participant because small deviations of asset prices could signi…cantly change these exposures for the large participant. the sign convention considered. It also shows the threshold K b j and the relationship between gross exposures and net exposures. Net exposures are calculated by adding the collateral pledged to the gross exposures. Hence, the distribution of net exposures is shifted to the right by an amount equal to the collateral pledged.
For given E b j and a quantile threshold Q b j for each of the three systems considered, we measure systemic risk in the network of FMIs, de…ned as the probability that two or more FMIs have a large credit risk exposure to the same FMI participant. We study four cases. First, we consider the joint probability that three FMIs simultaneously have a large credit risk exposure:
Then, we consider three cases for the joint probability that two FMIs simultaneously have a large credit risk exposure (CDCS and CDSX, CDCS and LVTS, CDSX and LVTS),
We are also interested in studying conditional probabilities for combinations of FMIs such as
These conditional probabilities provide useful information on the systemic risk contribution of one or more FMIs to another FMI by a participant. This systemic risk measure di¤ers from an individual FMI's own risk measure related to participant b (value-at-risk) as it gives information about the part of systemic risk that can be attributed to another system.
Extreme value methods have proved to be an e¤ective way to calculate probabilities of tail events in the …nancial system (Gravelle and Li, 2013) . To the best of our knowledge, these methods have not been used to estimate systemic risk in the network of FMIs. In Appendix A we show how we use these methods to calculate the joint and conditional probability in Eqs. (3), (4) and (5).
Systemic risk across FMIs and participants in …nancial distress
The probabilities in Eqs. (3), (4) and (5) A participant b is de…ned to be in …nancial distress (crash, failure or collapse) if its stock return, S b , falls below a given crisis level (Q b S ) at a given tail probability p, i.e.,
Ideally, detailed balance sheet data on assets and liabilities should be used to construct measures of …nancial distress for participants, but balance sheet data usually have a low frequency and cannot be combined with the daily FMI exposure data. The stock returns have two major advantages. First, they can be updated in a more timely fashion. Second, they are usually forward-looking, because price movements re ‡ect changes in market anticipation of the future performance of participants.
We denote by S b the …rst di¤erence of log daily prices in participant b stock, P b (t): Table 1 shows statistics for the distribution of log daily stock returns (common equity) for all FMI participants with publicly traded stock for the years 2004-11. There is substantial variation in stock 8 See Monnet et al. (2010) . 9 There are other candidates that could be used to measure …nancial distress, such as credit default swaps (CDS). However, CDS for Canadian …nancial institutions are typically traded over-the-counter, and therefore it is an opaque and not very liquid market (Reid, 2005) . The choice of bank equity prices for measuring the credit risk of banks may be motivated by the option-theoretic framework toward default of Merton (1974) . Merton's approach has become the cornerstone of a large body of approaches for quantifying credit risk and modeling credit rating. returns, with a maximum daily value of 0.32 and a minimum of -0.89. 5%-quantiles are negative in all years with an average value of -0.059. Returns for the years 2007, 2008 and 2011 are, on average, the lowest for the sample. Table 1 here We calculate probabilities in Eqs. (3), (4) and (5) by conditioning on the event that the participant is in …nancial distress, which occurs if the stock price falls below the threshold Q b S , which happens with probability p.
We estimate the joint probability that three FMIs simultaneously have a large credit risk exposure conditional on the event that the participant is in …nancial distress,
In order to measure the increase in the contribution to systemic risk conditional on the participant being in …nancial distress, we use the di¤erence between conditional and unconditional probabilities:
If b < 0, participants that are in …nancial distress contribute less to systemic risk in the network of FMIs. On the other hand, if b > 0, participants that are in …nancial distress contribute more to systemic risk in the network of FMIs. This di¤erence is calculated in a similar way using conditional probabilities, as in Eq. (5).
3 Credit risk exposures across FMIs
Credit risk exposures in CDCS
CDCS is the clearing system operated by the Canadian Derivatives Clearing Corporation (CDCC), a subsidiary of TMX Group. CDCS provides a CCP service for all equity derivatives, index derivatives and interest rate derivatives traded on the Montréal Exchange (MX). 10 Additionally, CDCS provides a clearing service for over-the-counter (OTC) equity options. The great majority of the trading of derivatives cleared in CDCS are originated on the MX.
The exposure of CDCS to a clearing member is equal to the payment obligation of the member due to the realized pro…ts and losses (P&L) of its portfolio of derivatives cleared by CDCS. A clearing member b has a long (L b s;t ) or short (S b s;t ) position on a given security s in day t. Depending on having a long or short position and the changes in the price P b s;t of the security, the end-of-day realized losses (variation margin) for participant b is equal to
where we use the following sign convention: V b s;t > 0 if participant b has a pro…t with security s, and V b s;t < 0 if it has a loss. Using the total portfolio of derivatives, we can calculate the aggregate losses of the participant b in period t:
We can de…ne the gross exposure of participant b in period t as the sum of all P&L in the portfolio,
A measure of net exposure can be generated using the total collateral pledged by the clearing member. Clearing members pledge initial margins, 11 and if there is a default in period t, the CCP 1 0 To control credit risk, CCPs use a legal instrument called novation. When the CCP novates the …nancial contract between two parties, it becomes the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer in the contract. CCPs also set risk controls (initial margins, default fund, etc.) to ensure that if a participant defaults, obligations between participants will be met under extreme but plausible stress scenarios.
1 1 Typically, initial margins B b;t 1 are set using some (value-at-risk) VaR methodology, can use the initial margin pledged at the end of the previous day to cover the losses. There is a wellestablished loss-allocation method to cover these losses; this is typically named "the waterfall." 12 We assume that net losses are obtained after considering the initial margin and the default fund of the participant; we do not consider other mechanisms that mutualize losses in the waterfall (additional contributions of capital of the survivors, etc.). Net losses are typically absorbed by the surviving participants or by the CCP. Therefore, we can calculate the net exposure as:
where B b;t 1 is the total initial margin pledged in the previous period, and DF b;t 1 is the total default fund.
Credit risk exposures in CDSX
CDSX is owned and operated by the Canadian Depository for Securities Limited (CDS), which in 2012 became a subsidiary of TMX Group. CDSX consists of a securities settlement system, a central securities depository and central counterparty services for eligible Canadian exchange-traded and over-the-counter equity trades (see McVanel, 2003) .
Every participant b has an end-of-day payment obligation, P O b;t , which is the total amount of cash that the participant has to transfer to the FMI due to the net acquisition of securities (if P O b;t 0), or has to receive from the FMI due to the net sale (if P O b;t < 0). Therefore, we can de…ne the gross exposure of participant b as
CDSX has a loss-allocation procedure in the event that a participant is unable to meet its end-of-day payment obligation, backed in part by a pool of collateral that all extenders of credit maintain in accordance with the requirements set out in the CDSX rules. During the historical period considered in our sample, CDSX used a combination of defaulter-pays and survivor-pays risk 1 2 See the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (2013) for more details.
tools. The sum of all contributions to the pool by each participant was called the initial Aggregate
Collateral Value (ACV). The value of the collateral in the initial ACV was set such that there was enough to cover the largest default among participants. Additional payment obligations not covered by the ACV must be covered with additional collateral contributions that increase the System Operating Cap (SOC). In any case, the payment obligation of an extender of credit with CDSX cannot be larger than the ACV or its SOC, whichever is less. 13 The collateral pool provides su¢ cient collateral to cover the payment obligation of the default of the largest extender of credit (at a 99% con…dence interval). We consider this collateral, and also additional collateral pledged by participants, to calculate the net exposure of a participant b in a day t, which is equal to
Credit risk exposures in the LVTS
The Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) 14 is the Canadian electronic funds-transfer system that settles large-value and time-critical Canadian-dollar payments. 15 The LVTS provides two types of payment streams: Tranche 1 (T1) and Tranche 2 (T2). A participant can send a T1 payment as long as its net owing position is no greater than the collateral it has pledged in T1. If there is a default of a participant, its collateral is used to cover any net negative (debit) position in T1. For this reason, T1 payments are known as "defaulter-pays."
In T2, each participant voluntarily grants a bilateral credit limit (BCL) to every other participant. This line of credit is de…ned as the largest net amount that a participant can receive. 16 In 1 3 Starting in January 2015, the collateral pool was eliminated; therefore, in recent years defaulter-pays risk tools have been more predominant in CDSX.
1 4 Other FMIs are overseen by the Bank of Canada, but we do not consider them in our analysis for a number of reasons. ACSS is the Canadian clearing system for small-value payments, and it is not considered to be of systemic importance. CLS Bank, located in New York (U.S.A.), is the global payment system for the settlement of foreign exchange transactions. The payment-versus-payment arrangement used in this system virtually eliminates all the credit risk, so we do not consider this FMI (see Kahn and Roberds, 2000; Miller and Northcott, 2002) . LCH.Clearnet's SwapClear (in London, U.K.) is a global system for the central clearing of interest rate swaps and other over-the-counter interest rate derivatives denominated in multiple currencies, including the Canadian dollar.
1 5 See Arjani and Mcvanel (2006) for a complete description of the system. 1 6 Credit risk may not be a concern if FMI participants in …nancial distress are prevented from participating in these systems. In practice, opacity of …nancial markets and other frictions may prevent this. For instance, BCLs were approximately constant during the recent …nancial crisis, suggesting that many LVTS participants were not perceiving clearly the risk of their counterparties (Allen et al., 2011). addition, each participant has a multilateral net debit cap used for sending payments. Each LVTS participant pledges to the Bank of Canada an amount of collateral that depends on the largest BCL.
If a participant fails to settle its …nal payment obligation, all losses not covered by the defaulting participant's collateral are allocated pro rata among the survivors based on their BCL with the defaulting participant. For this reason, T2 has been described as a "survivor-pays" system. 17 We calculate each participant's net position for the two tranches by adding together its T1 and T2 multilateral positions. At the end of the day, some participants may hold a net credit (positive) position, which means that they have received a net amount from the LVTS. Others hold a net debit (negative) position, which means that they have sent a net amount from the LVTS. For a given day t, we can calculate the gross exposure of participant b by simply adding all payments received and sent to the system from the beginning of the day until the end of the day: 
4 Empirical results
Data sources
We combine data from a variety of sources to calculate exposures across systems of di¤erent clearing participants. We have detailed data on the LVTS provided by the Canadian Payments Association (CPA). These data consist of all the daily payments sent and received by each LVTS participant, with the exact time of day, for each tranche. With this information, we can calculate the total debit/credit position at the end of the day. We also have the total collateral pledged by each participant each day to determine net exposures.
With regard to CDCS, we have long and short positions (i.e., the daily trading positions at market close) for the three-month Canadian bankers'acceptance futures (BAX), the 10-year Gov- In order to jointly consider the di¤erent systems, we need to manually match the names of the di¤erent FMI participants across systems so that we have a single name that corresponds to the same participant across FMIs. Since the number of participants in Canadian FMIs is relatively low, this is a feasible task. Table 2 shows statistics for di¤erent types of exposures across systems and participants. We use a sample of seven large participants (P1-P7) in all three systems, which accounts for a signi…cant fraction of the Canadian …nancial industry. To provide a complete overview of the distribution of the exposures in all three FMIs, we use the sign convention as previously explained: A positive exposure means that the FMI owes money to the participant, and a negative exposure means that the participant owes money to the FMI. Net exposures are calculated by adding the collateral pledged to the gross exposures. Therefore, Table 2 In addition, we …nd that net exposures in CDSX show large positive numbers; meanwhile, gross exposures show large negative numbers. This is because the collateral scheme used in CDSX causes the collateral contributions (ACV and SOC) to be much larger than the gross exposures. Table 3 shows the estimated joint and conditional probabilities (expressed in percentages) for the same seven large participants (P1-P7) shown in Table 2 . We use the extreme value theory 2 1 At the end of the day, any short or long positions in the LVTS must be settled, either through interbank trades or with the central bank at a penalty rate (Allen et al., 2015) .
Exposures across systems and participants
Systemic risk measures
2 2 For instance, starting in late 2008, non-mortgage loan portfolios were temporarily eligible for collateral in the LVTS. The temporary measure was adopted to provide LVTS participants with greater ‡exibility in managing their collateral. As conditions in funding markets improved, the proportion of non-mortgage loan portfolios to total collateral pledged allowed was gradually reduced from 100 per cent to 20 per cent, e¤ective April 2010. methodology to calculate these probabilities. The detailed explanation of the extreme value method is reported in Appendix A.
The results in these tables are calculated by considering the thresholds Q 5 equal to 5%-quantiles of the corresponding exposures (i.e., Pr(E b j Q 5 ) = 5% for any b and j) obtained for each FMI and participant. Table 3 here Panel A in Table 3 reports the joint probabilities corresponding to gross exposures for two and three FMIs. These joint probabilities are small, indicating that the systemic risk is low. In general,
] is the largest across participants, suggesting that CDSX and the LVTS have a stronger dependence on gross exposures than the other two systems. On average, the interdependence between CDSX and the LVTS is 75% higher than for CDCS and CDSX, and 55%
larger than for CDCS and the LVTS. On the other hand, P1 is, on average, the largest contributor to systemic risk (0.183%), followed by P3 (0.18%) and P6 (0.16%).
Panel B reports the contributions to systemic risk of one FMI to two FMIs by a participant.
] from Panel A (0.16%), suggesting that the LVTS has a relatively large contribution to systemic risk in the other two FMIs. We also …nd that CDSX contributes to systemic risk in CDCS and the LVTS. On the other hand, we …nd that
suggesting that CDCS does not signi…cantly contribute to systemic risk in the other two systems.
By comparing the remainder of the conditional probabilities in Panel B, we can …nd interesting results. On average, the contributions of two FMIs to to the systemic risk of a third one are larger than the contributions of one FMI to another one. This result suggests that it is more likely that one FMI is in stress if the other two are also in stress. We also observe that CDCS and CDSX jointly provide the largest systemic risk contribution to LVTS, with 6.65%.
Panels C and D provide information for the case of net exposures. Overall, contributions to systemic risk in terms of joint or conditional probabilities are larger for net exposures than for gross exposures. Since net exposures are equal to gross exposures plus collateral, this suggests that there could be some positive correlation between collateral levels across FMIs. Also, when comparing participants, P7 is the largest contributor to systemic risk in terms of joint net exposures, with 0.516%, followed by P6 with 0.386%.
In summary, we …nd that, on average, P1, P3, P6 and P7 have larger systemic risk contributions than the remainder of the participants.
Systemic risk across FMIs and participants in …nancial distress
In Table 4 we show key statistics for the value of the di¤erence b in Eq. (8) where we use 5%-quantiles in all cases. We consider all participants with publicly traded stock (see Table 1 for some statistics of stock returns used in our sample). The statistics of b are calculated across all participants for unconditional and conditional probabilities, gross and net exposures. We observe large statistical dispersion in all cases, but when considering average values, the majority of the cases considered give a value b > 0. Cases where b > 0 are about twice as frequent as cases where b < 0. This suggests that, on average, participants in …nancial distress are more likely to contribute to systemic risk in the network of FMIs.
In addition, dispersion of the values of b suggest that there is signi…cant heterogeneity across participants. Therefore, there are participants that can be considered as more systemically important than others because they contribute more to systemic risk in the network of FMIs in case of …nancial stress. Table 4 here
Conclusion
We propose a measure of systemic risk in the network of FMIs by considering participant-based interdependencies that arise from the activities of one participant in two or more FMIs. Our paper provides a new framework and a methodology to measure systemic risk in the network of FMIs that has not been previously considered in the literature.
We …nd a rich set of results. Some participants have a larger contribution to systemic risk than other participants. When conditioning on the …nancial distress of participants, we …nd that, on average, participants that are more likely to be in …nancial distress are also more likely to contribute to systemic risk in the network of FMIs. All these results suggest that our work could be useful in better understanding the systemic risk contributions of participants in the network of FMIs, which could have relevant implications for the appropriate macroprudential regulation of the …nancial system.
Although our approach has limitations, we see it as the …rst stage of a long-term research agenda that could help us to better understand the most e¤ective ways of implementing the regulation and oversight of systemically important FMIs, which may require a more detailed system-wide analysis.
This could have important implications for more e¤ective macroprudential regulation of the …nancial system.
Appendices Appendix A Extreme value approach
For analytical convenience, Eqs. (3), (4) and (5) can in practice be estimated using left quantiles using trivial transformations. For a given signi…cance level p j , corresponding to the three systems, there exist three left tail quantiles Q j (p j ); j = 1; 2; and 3; such that
Note that we can choose p j such that Q j (p j ) = K b j so we can estimate Eq. (3). From elementary probability theory we can now easily write a probability measure by using the notation introduced above,
Given this speci…cation, a proper estimation of is of key importance. If we know a parametric speci…cation of the joint distribution function, can be easily calculated, because we can estimate the distributional parameters using parametric methods. However, since there is no evidence that these exposures follow the same distribution, a serious problem with the parametric speci…cation is the misspeci…cation of the model, which could lead to misleading results in inference and hypothesis testing. To avoid speci…c parametric assumptions of the distribution, we use the semiparametric extreme value theory approach proposed by Ledford and Tawn (1996) and Poon et al. (2004) to estimate . This theory is used to study the limiting distribution of the extreme values of a random variable instead of the distribution of this random variable. According to this theory, even though fat-tailed random variables may follow di¤erent distributions, such as a stable Paretian or mixtures of normals, at the limit they all converge to the same underlying distribution.
The estimation of can be determined by the dependence among exposures and their marginal distributions. We transform the original series E b j to a series with a common marginal distribution.
By using that transformation, di¤erences in joint tail probabilities can be purely due to di¤erences in the tail dependence of the extreme exposures.
To be precise, we transform these participants'exposures to unit Pareto marginals,
where F E b j ( ) represents the marginal cumulative distribution function (cdf) for E b j . If we replace the unknown marginal distributions with their empirical distribution functions, we obtain,
where n is the number of observations of E b j and R E b j is the rank order statistic of E b j .
By transforming these variables, we can rewrite the joint tail probability as follows,
And Z = minfZ 1 ; Z 2 g: Hence, the transformation to unit Pareto marginals reduces the estimation of the multivariate probability to a simple univariate probability. The only assumption that has to be made is that the distribution of the minimum series Z = min(Z 1 ; Z 2 ) displays fat tails. Popular distribution models like the Student-t exhibit such behavior.
The univariate tail probability for a fat-tailed random variable can be estimated by using the semiparametric probability estimator from De Haan et al. (1994) ,
where > 0 is an unknown parameter and the tail cut-o¤ point C n k;n is the (n k) th ascending order statistic from the cross-sectional minimum series such that lim n!1 [1=k(n)] = 0 and k = o(n).
This tail probability estimator in Eq. (25) depends on the tail index and the threshold parameter k: 23 This tail index captures the tail probability's rate of decay in the probability.
Clearly, the lower is, the slower the probability decay and the higher the probability mass in the tail of Z:
To estimate ; we use the popular Hill et al. (1975) estimator for the index of regular variation
where^ is the estimate of the parameter of tail dependence. A relatively high^ corresponds with a relatively high dependence of the components ( e E 1 ; :::; e E m )k: Further details on the Hill estimator can be found in Jansen and De Vries (1991) . 24 The choice of the threshold parameter k is a point of concern in the extreme value theory literature. If k is set too low, too few observations are considered in the estimation. If one considers 2 3 This estimator basically extends the empirical distribution of Z outside the domain of the sample by means of its asymptotic Pareto tail from P [Z > q] l(q)q ;
1 with q large and where l(q) is a slowly varying function (i.e., limq!1l(xq)=l(q) = 1 for all …xed x > 0).An intuitive derivation of the estimator is provided in Danielsson and De Vries (2000) .
2 4 Quintos et al. (2001) develop a number of tests for identifying single unknown breaks in the estimator of the tail index ( ). Their tests are used to assess whether breakpoints in asset return distributions exist for Asian stock markets. In addition, Hartmann et al. (2005) use these tests to assess various hypotheses regarding the evolution and structure of systemic risk in the banking system. a large k; non-tail events may enter the estimation. Hence, if one includes too many observations, the variance of the estimate is reduced at the expense of a bias in the tail estimation. With too few observations, the bias declines but the variance of the estimate becomes too large. A number of methods have been proposed to select k in …nite samples. Goldie and Smith (1987) suggest selecting the parameter k so as to minimize the asymptotic mean-squared error. In our paper, we use the widely used heuristic procedure by plotting the tail estimator as a function of k and select k in a region where^ is stable. In this …gure we show a simple case of two participants that are members of the three FMIs. A default of participant 1 could be a very stressful event for participant 2 if it needs to use its own resources to cover this default in every FMI.
Figure 2: Gross and net credit exposures
In this diagram we represent the distribution of gross and net exposures. We have the following sign convention: A positive exposure means that the FMI owes to the participant; a negative exposure means that the participant owes to the FMI. Net exposures are calculated by adding the collateral pledged to the gross exposures. We show an example of daily intraday price variations of a future contract traded on the Montréal Exchange and cleared in CDCS.
Figure 4: Example of the gross position of an LVTS participant on a representative day
We show the net aggregate position for T1 and T2 for a …nancial institution in the LVTS for a representative day. A positive (credit) position means that the system owes money to the …nancial institution (the total amount of payments received is greater than the total amount of payments sent), whereas a negative (debit) position means that the …nancial institution owes a net amount to the system.
Figure 5: Gross and net exposures of di¤erent systems across years (in billions)
We show end-of-day exposures for the three systems considered, measured in billions of dollars. Gross exposures (before collateral) are in the left column, net exposures (after collateral) in the right column. We have the following sign convention: A positive exposure means that the FMI owes to the participant, a negative exposure means that the participant owes to the FMI. Net exposures are calculated by adding the collateral pledged to the gross exposures.
